Western philosophy has ignored the psychedelic experience for too long. The focus on a particular logical framework is misplaced and our apparent emphasis on empiricism cannot be complete until we take into account all experiences, writes Michel Weber.

Philosophy of mind has been crippled, since its very beginnings, by two main prejudices. First, the blind implementation of the traditional Western logical framework, that boils down to Aristotelian logic; second, the perennial neglect of crucially relevant empirical data, in so far as, in most arguments, sense-perception is reduced to sight alone.

We can overcome these crippling effects if we take into account data coming not only from the other external senses, but also from internal senses, as well as what is gathered in altered states of mind — including, of course, the psychedelic state. This completely redefines the limits and possibilities of knowledge, both from the systematical (hence logical) and the empirical points of view.

Firstly, philosophy of mind has been weakened by the blind implementation of the traditional Western logical framework, that boils down to the Boolean version of Aristotelian logic. (cf. Weber 2003)

Aristotelian logic is traditionally defined by three principles: the principle of identity, the principle of non-contradiction, and the principle of excluded middle. The principle of identity states simply that we come to know all things in so far as they have some enduring unity and identity (Metaphysics B 4). It has to be linked with the substance-attribute ontology granting permanence amid flux. The principle of contradiction is somewhat the negative side of the principle of identity: it claims that the same attribute cannot, at the same time and in the same respect, belong and not belong to the same subject (Metaphysics G 3; Posterior Analytics I, 77a10–22). For Aristotle, it is “the most certain of all principles,” the “natural starting-point for all the other axioms” — so much so that he does not believe that Heraclitus has ever really maintained that contrary attributes belong at the same time to the same subject. According to the principle of excluded middle (or tertium non datur), there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories: of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate (Metaphysics G 7; Posterior Analytics I, 77a22–25).

Philosophy of mind has been crippled, since its very beginnings, by two main prejudices

From a formal point of view, the difference between a contradiction and a paradox is straightforward enough. A contradiction is a statement that is always false — and everybody agrees that it is so because some mistake must have occurred in the chain of reasoning. A paradox, as its etymology shows, is a contradiction that has the appearance of truth. As a result, there are numerous opinions regarding the way of understanding them; no consensus prevails. A distinction should be made between those who claim that paradoxes could be solved through a more thorough understanding of their internal dynamic (think of Bertrand Russell’s quest), those for whom finite reason generates, at least in some (circumscribed) circumstances, paradoxes (such as Kant’s antinomies), and those who claim that reason is inexorably paradoxical, and so is Nature (such as Hegel’s dialectic). In the first case, paradoxes are nothing but (stubborn) temporary difficulties; in the second, they point to the unavoidable blind spot of reason; in the third, they are fully part of the mundane ontological structure. In any case, the decision can be made to try to formalize them, and this can be achieved with or without modifying the three Aristotelian principles mentioned above.