Melis Erdur
Melis Erdur received her Ph.D. in philosophy from the New York University in 2013. In her dissertation A Moral Critique of Moral Philosophy, she criticizes the common assumption that moral discourse requires a particular sort of philosophical “ground”: a morally neutral account of rightness, wrongness, obligations and values, which would provide final and all-embracing answers to questions such as “What in the end makes any moral statement true or false?” and “Why be moral?” She published two noteworthy academic papers, “A Moral Argument Against Moral Realism” (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2016) and “Moral Realism and the Incompletability of Morality” (Journal of Value Inquiry, 2018), before leaving academia (but not philosophy).
Contact: meliserdur@gmail.com
Melis Erdur received her Ph.D. in philosophy from the New York University in 2013. In her dissertation A Moral Critique of Moral Philosophy, she criticizes the common assumption that moral discourse requires a particular sort of philosophical “ground”: a morally neutral account of rightness, wrongness, obligations and values, which would provide final and all-embracing answers to questions such as “What in the end makes any moral statement true or false?” and “Why be moral?” She published two noteworthy academic papers, “A Moral Argument Against Moral Realism” (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2016) and “Moral Realism and the Incompletability of Morality” (Journal of Value Inquiry, 2018), before leaving academia (but not philosophy).
Contact: meliserdur@gmail.com