How To Be A 'Promiscuous Realist'
James Ladyman
About the Course
Substance, essence, being - for centuries philosophers and scientists have tried to get to the heart of what constitutes the ‘things’ that make up the universe, from kitchen tables to subatomic particles. In this course, James Ladyman, Professor in the Philosophy of Science, gives his unique account of scientific realism, the belief that science addresses the ‘big questions’ of philosophy, and argues that there is no fundamental level of reality that describes the world.
In this course, you will learn:
- The arguments for and against Scientific realism and anti-realism.
- How our idea of science develops through radical theory change.
- How we reconcile our ‘manifest’ reality to our scientific understanding.
- What philosophy does that science cannot replace.
- Why our understanding of reality is complicated by different ‘scales of being’.
- Why there may be no ultimate reality.
- Why relations between objects, not ‘substances’ might be what is most essential about the world.
- How we might adopt a ‘promiscuous realism’.
As part of the course there are in-video quiz questions to consolidate your learning, suggested further readings to stimulate a deeper exploration of the topic, discussion boards to have your say and an end-of-course assessment set by Professor Ladyman.
About the Instructor
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James Ladyman
"Scientists and others sometimes deride philosophy on the basis of very little, if any, evidence of what it is like."
James Ladyman is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Bristol, where he is occupied principally with general philosophy of science and philosophy of physics. During his undergraduate study of pure mathematics, Ladyman's interests extended to philosophy and theoretical physics, and he pursued postgraduate qualifications in philosophy of science. He has defended the view of reality known as "naturalised metaphysics", which seeks to update metaphysics in the light of contemporary findings in science.He has worked extensively in scientific realism, constructive empiricism and structural realism. In 1998 he made the the distinction between epistemic and ontic forms of structural realism and has defended the latter since.
Course Syllabus
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Part One: Introducing Anti-RealismMust philosophy adhere to contemporary science? Does Metaphysics need objects and causation?
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Part Two: Questioning the AtomAre atoms real? Ladyman illustrates why in science and philosophy, objects are no longer required.
Suggested Further Readings
Books
Kuhn, T. S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
Hull, D. L., Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
van Fraassen, B. C., The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
Articles
Ladyman, J., ‘Scientific Realism Again’, Philosophia, 35 (2007), 197–236.
Rowbottom, D. P., ‘A Methodological Argument Against Scientific Realism’, Synthese, 185.2 (2012), 189–204.
Papers
Stanford, K., ‘Epistemic Anti-Realism’, The Journal of Philosophy, 99.5 (2002), 237–249.
Park, S., ‘The Pessimistic Induction and the Exponential Growth of Science Reassessed’, Synthese, 190.14 (2013), 2919–2932.
Explore Further
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