Antirealism and the analytic-continental split

The Kantian legacy

The analytic – continental divide in philosophy is alive and kicking in the academy. Beyond the exchange of accusations and insults there is little genuine communication between the two traditions. But understanding the root of their divergence – different reactions to Kant’s argument that perceived reality is conditioned by our cognitive makeup – can be the key to getting the two sides to talk to each other, and even recognize that they have more in common than they think, argues Lee Braver.

 

The split between analytic and continental philosophy has been one of the defining features of the profession over the last 100 years or so. These two branches differ in many ways, down to such foundational matters as what kinds of questions to ask and answers to accept, as well as whom to draw upon for aid and inspiration in answering their questions. The division functions largely as a partition separating the two into parallel play, each side carrying on as if the other didn’t exist. On those occasions when someone does peer over the divider, their questions generally range from whether the other side is doing good philosophy to whether they are doing philosophy at all. Accusations of academic fraud regularly arise, with indignant characterizations of the others’ skills as primarily in tricking the gullible into lengthy disquisitions on various emperors’ sartorial status.

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