We tend to think of liberal democracies as secular. But religious ideas are increasingly gaining power over our politics. Populist leaders are deified, and religious beliefs are informing key political debates like abortion and gay marriage. Stuart Grey argues that Renaissance philosopher Nicolo Machiaveli and Ancient Indian thinker Kautilya explain how supposedly religion-free liberal politics became coopted by theology.

In modern secular democracies such as the United States we generally congratulate ourselves for not having a theologically based form of governance—but is this a smokescreen? Historically, liberal democracies with citizen equality and the rule of law were implemented in response to the arbitrary whim of elites, be they religious, economic or aristocratic. In many Western nations, the rule of law, legitimised through the free consent of the governed, was established in response to the wars of religion in Europe during the medieval and early modern periods. Liberal philosophical tenets and representative democracy were then combined in early modern “contract theory,” which allowed communities to conceive how they might legitimate political authority without a deity. The achievement was a form of governance grounded in a social contract among theoretically free and equal citizens that possessed natural rights, requiring these citizens to tolerate deep doctrinal disagreements so that they could achieve a peaceable sphere in which to pursue their chosen individual conceptions of the good. But even though it may seem that we have extricated God from politics, his influence was never truly stamped out.

Political theory makes a distinction between those who are ‘in’ authority versus ‘an’ authority. Those ‘in’ authority possess their authority by virtue of the office they hold, so that power and legitimacy are invested in the office and not the person. In contrast, those who are ‘an’ authority possess their authority by virtue of some special characteristic, knowledge, or attribute that is understood to justify the position they hold. The purported upshot of having a system wherein political power is invested in offices, as opposed to personal characteristics, is that political legitimacy need not rely entirely on the personal attributes of fallible, partial, or corrupt human beings, instead relying on a system of offices and rule of law. Potentially corrupt or self-interested politicians can then be shuttled in and out of authoritative offices at the behest of citizens during regular elections. But what if assuming that this is how things work prevents us from seeing what might be happening beneath the surface of contemporary American politics?

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The contrast between Kautilyan and Machiavelli proves useful because it allows us to assess the comparative realist measures that could be justified within a secular versus theological form of realism.

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In 2014, I published an essay in the journal Political Theory that compared the political thought of classical Indian thinker Kautilya, and the infamous Italian realist Niccolò Machiavelli. In the essay I compared their respective political realisms, with “realism” indicating a political theory claiming to view politics as it “really is,” centered around things like power and self-interest, and disavowed moral or philosophical principles as naïve anchors for a truly effective approach to politics and governance. On the one hand, Kautilya’s brand of realism was theologically driven, while Machiavelli’s was secular in orientation and untethered from fundamental religious or theological commitments.

In the South Asian context, Kautilya offered an incredibly detailed manual for a ruler, titled Arthaśāstra (“Treatise on Governance”), which covered a rather comprehensive range of topics, including: how rulers should be trained intellectually and physically; how they should approach domestic governance, war, and international affairs; and how they should surveil their populace and wield the ‘rod of punishment’ both covertly and explicitly through the judicial system. The contrast between Kautilyan and Machiavelli proves useful because it allows us to assess the comparative realist measures that could be justified within a secular versus theological form of realism. Kautilya’s political thought also provides a cross-cultural vantage point that helps us locate potentially similar, and deeply problematic, theological motivations and tactics involved in different types of political realism. In sum, the comparison of Kautilya with Machiavelli helps to reveal how (supposedly) secular realist doctrines can lead us to overlook aggressive and repressive tactics available in political regimes that have turned a Machiavellian corner, but perhaps not followed the subsequent path far enough.

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Comparison of Kautilya with Machiavelli helps to reveal how (supposedly) secular realist doctrines can lead us to overlook aggressive and repressive tactics.

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Modern Western democracies, of course, found philosophical inspiration from theories such as Machiavelli’s. A secular realism, combined with the advantages of political liberalism and democracy, provides much of the theoretical superstructure underlying the U.S.’s political system. However, my comparative analysis exposed an intriguing yet troubling idea: could deep-seated theological ideas or impulses actually be operative, and even thrive, within secular democracies such as the U.S. due to a “secular smokescreen” effect? What if our self-flattering political consciousness in the U.S.—which partly derives sustenance from the secular mythos discussed earlier—prevents us from identifying dangerous theological, or quasi-theological, forces lurking beneath the surface of American politics?

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The smokescreen effect allows theological driven governance to hide behind liberal institutionalism that justifies acts of surveillance, violence, or religiously motivated legal reforms.

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A secular smokescreen constitutes a type of mass-based psychological veil for deeper motivations that may harbor theological tendencies. Political liberalism (philosophically speaking), democracy, and social contract theory could be labelled as sub-typical strategies of a broader secular realist orientation toward politics. Each of these strategies rejects moral, philosophical, or religious forms of an objective Truth or highest good as legitimating political power. In short, we must agree to disagree on the highest things (liberal toleration) and take them as our personal opinions in the public sphere—even if we believe they are objectively true. For example, a hyper-devout Christian may believe interest on loans is immoral, but where this practice is legal this theological belief must acquiesce to the secular demands of law. If politics is a nasty, self-interested activity in which differing groups and individuals jostle for power in a de-divinized world, then secular liberal democracies could be viewed as a non-theological way of stabilizing naturally anarchic human environments.

Into this de-divinised politics, the smokescreen appears. The smokescreen effect allows theological driven governance to hide behind liberal institutionalism that justifies acts of  surveillance, violence, or religiously motivated legal reforms. This situation can then lead to a dangerous hypocrisy whereby American citizens assume a secular realism reigns in contemporary politics, and that power remains unmoored from any particular brand of theology. All the while, a theological impetus or religious form of morality may continue to justify various political actions under the cover of secularism. In this regard, we might consider the following examples.

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Torture could be part of a new-age American religious crusade; and de-democratization may partially result from the persistence of a unitary executive fashioned after a Hobbesian mortal god on earth.

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Some U.S. citizens may have thought their government’s realist tactics in fighting terrorism in the wake of 9/11 were justified by non-theological tenets, perhaps believing they were defending democratic “freedom.” However, one might consider the following alternatives: the culture of fear may emerge from a political theology of security, wherein citizens seek authoritarian-style government protection from seeming existential threats that are depicted as religiously motivated; torture could be part of a new-age American religious crusade; and de-democratization may partially result from the persistence of a unitary executive fashioned after a Hobbesian mortal god on earth (Leviathan).

While these may serve as more subtle examples, one might consider recent anti-abortion laws that have emerged in many states throughout the U.S. Put bluntly, these laws inculcate state governments in forms of theocratic governance, resulting in what could be called “micro-theocracies.” Here, aggressive political theologies can thrive under the cover of what might initially appear to be democratic accountability, allowing religiously oriented populations across the U.S. to enforce their theological commitments and claims of moral superiority upon others who do not share their worldview. This phenomenon should remind us of what I discussed above: namely, that secular democracies were established on the principle that we fellow human beings fundamentally disagreed on any moral or religious highest good, and must therefore agree to disagree on such things.

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This point is essential for the survival of any liberal democracy predicated on some version of social contract theory. As it pertains to abortion laws, it may help to cite one of the earliest and most influential social contract theorists, John Locke, who clearly stated that all individuals own their bodies as a form of property and are free to do with this property whatever they wish, so long as it does not directly violate one or more natural rights of another rational adult person. Locke states: “[Y]et every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself” (§27, Second Treatise of Government). In the case of recent abortion bans, states such as Texas violate this pillar of modern contract theory and liberal democratic philosophy, which justifies each person’s freedom of choice over their own body as the most intimate form of private property. Accordingly, owning one’s own body as property means one cannot be coerced without one’s consent. Abortion bans represent a clear violation of this principle and the use of political power fueled by religious moralism.

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These mechanisms provide a “God’s eye” view of everyone, amounting to new-age authoritarianism under the legitimating smokescreen provided by concepts such as democratic freedom.

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In the socio-economic sphere, American citizens increasingly allow powerful transnational corporations every opportunity to view, surveil, judge, and sell citizens (including citizens back to themselves) their respective goods through ever-enhanced machine learning algorithms and early-stage artificial intelligence technologies. These mechanisms provide a “God’s eye” view of everyone, amounting to new-age authoritarianism under the legitimating smokescreen provided by concepts such as democratic freedom. This pervasive phenomenon keeps people normalized and placidly appeased with the current socio-economic situation, as we gobble up personally tailored information and goods through the pervasive dopamine delivery system furnished by capitalism and social media. In this instance, corporations have taken on the sovereign function of “mortal gods” on earth once trumpeted by Hobbes in 17th century England. An immanent corporate theology then possesses the following characteristics. First, the combination of modern nation-state and transnational corporations that are co-dependent and viewed as too big to fail. Second, the first mortal god, the modern nation-state, protects the “rights” of these corporate entities to survive and flourish as they surveil, gather data, and deliver happiness in the form of repeated consumption, entertainment and pleasure.

Precisely because secular democracies congratulate themselves for remaining untainted by the seductions of authoritarian or theologically derived power—separating the power of religion/church from state power and protecting things like individual freedom and the rule of law (neither of which protected reproductive rights in the state of Texas)—we fail to see how theological or quasi-theological forces flourish beneath the surface and endanger the health of democratic politics. In sum, we could consider any number of recent events and their broader political philosophical implications: Guantanamo Bay and the use of torture; NSA and corporate surveillance; impositions of democratic, neoliberal, and capitalist structures throughout the globe; ascendence of authoritarian personalities in politics. For the latter type of example, look no further than former President Donald Trump and his assault on the results of a free and fair democratic election.

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Such demagoguery is partly operationalized by the American secular smokescreen. That is, some people found it perfectly justified to rally around a single individual and assist him in his attempt to overturn the results of a fair democratic election.

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At present Trump’s legitimacy among his supporters even transcends an impartial court’s decisions. Indictments piled high make little hay with his supporters, who will likely vote for him regardless of his charges in the next presidential election. The authoritarian elements of Trump’s presidency are vast. Still, we could point out how his followers willingly committed acts of violence on his behalf in the events of January 6th, ransacking buildings and assaulting law officers to hunt down the democratically elected representatives viewed as Trump’s enemies. Here we should recall how these representatives are ‘in’ authority, yet viewed as threats to Trump’s political creed. In contrast, Trump’s supporters are spurred by someone viewing himself as ‘an’ authority deserving to be in office for another term, as a demagogic figure above the rule of law. Interpreted from the perspective of my 2014 article, such demagoguery is partly operationalized by the American secular smokescreen. That is, some people found it perfectly justified to rally around a single individual and assist him in his attempt to overturn the results of a fair democratic election. Here I can highlight a few telling details witnessed before and after the January 6th insurrection. His followers did not march under the name of a particular party, but rather committed acts of violence in his name, Donald Trump, which donned many of his supporters’ flags and banners. Moreover, we see a higher cause referenced in Trump’s slogan: “Make America Great Again.” Note that the word “make” is a command or imperative with clear authoritarian overtones—either you are for America and must do whatever it takes to recover its past glory, or you are against the cause and therefore unpatriotic. Also, note that it is not American democracy and its various ideals that are trumpeted, but a singular entity marked out as ‘America’, carrying an ethos for which we could almost insert the word ‘God’. Finally, this cause justified a singular leader that would return his constituency to the promised land of a storied past deeply grounded in structures of racism and sexism. If modern nation-states and transnational corporations have become systemically omnipotent, Trump in particular commands a following that resembles religious zealotry.

How is all this conceivable? If not motivated directly by theological forces, these examples at least introduce the possibility that we have swapped a deep-seated belief in secular democracy for the older theological principles that once animated the Western political landscape. Such an exchange, in effect, has blurred the boundaries between the older political theologies and newer ones, as important elements of secularism and liberal democracy give way to new forms of authoritarianism, justifying hitherto unimagined acts of surveillance and coercion. In turn, contemporary U.S. politics may bear witness to something my comparative analysis of Kautilya and Machiavelli had exposed: the possibility that our deep faith in secular democracy now allows some people to smuggle (quasi?) theological principles in the back door while trumpeting secular democratic principles at the front door. My original claim was that Kautilya’s theological realism could furnish a mirror for our political condition to help us identify our potential blind spots. I continue to believe that such comparisons are valuable in helping us become more self-aware and critically reflective as we witness the increasing emergence of large-scale, multifaceted forms of authoritarian governance pervading our lives in purportedly secular democracies. Sadly, these phenomena may represent the emergence of new theological wine, bottled in the older casks of authoritarian structures from which original liberal democracies first emerged.