Arguing that gender is a social construct has long been a feminist concern. However, in its most simplistic form, it relies on mind-body dualism and presumes a blank state on which the mind is formed. Instead we should recognise that the mind is fundamentally connected to the body, but also that the sexed body is as much a social construct as anything else argues Louise Richardson-Self.

One of the most significant conceptual distinctions for feminist activism has been the sex/gender distinction.

On the basis of such a distinction, feminists have argued that most characteristics, traits, and tendencies we typically ascribe to men and women are not actually consequences of sex—the physical characteristics of the reproductive body—but rather they are learned via socialisation—that is, they are attributes of a gendered identity.

This meant that the usual justifications for women’s subordination to men—that they were too emotional for politics, better suited to the nurturing of children, etc.—could no longer hold water. If women were not by nature subordinate to men, then there was no good reason to keep them out of power, to exclude them from the public sphere, to treat them as inferior, and so forth.