Realists and idealists argue about whether physical objects exist, whether they are real or just part of a world of ideas. But can they at root help us solve the most important philosophical questions? In this instalment of our idealism series, in partnership with the Essentia Foundation, David R. Cerbone argues that Wittgenstein can help us return to more substantive questions. Should we be Idealist or Realists in the first place?

In his very first meeting with Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein is reported to have said “that he did not think either realism or idealism was satisfactory: one would have to take some third position between them.” According to Rush Rhees, Russell rebuked the young Wittgenstein for seeking an intermediate position, since “you would have to have an intermediate position between this new one and each of the others, and so on ad infinitum.” But Wittgenstein’s early dissatisfaction with both realism and idealism persisted throughout the ensuing four decades of philosophical thinking and writing. He developed a neither-nor attitude towards realism and idealism, which is particularly clear in his much later comments on the subject in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (also published under the title Zettel, which means “scraps” or “fragments”). Here he suggests that the debate between idealists and realists has no practical significance for our lives.