Read part 1: Tom Sorell on why human beings are the only animals who act morally.
Read part 2: Mark Rowlands argues that animals can act morally – we need to look at the evidence.
Read part 3: Sorell warns against the dangers of anthropocentrism in moral philosophy.

Tom Sorell and I are in agreement on at least one thing. As he puts it: “What I think is necessary for moral behaviour is acting for certain kinds of reason, where the reasons operate to produce the relevant behaviour.” I agree. We differ, however, on this: I think at least some (non-human) animals can act on reasons of this sort. Sorell is sceptical of this. I’m really not sure why he is, and I’m reasonably confident he shouldn’t be.

First of all, we should be aware that the notion of a moral reason for action is neither clear nor univocal. Indeed, neither is that of a reason for action more generally – whether moral or not. As Philippa Foot once said: "I am sure that I do not understand the idea of a reason for acting, and I wonder whether anyone else does either." There are different conceptions of the reasons for acting – practical reasons as philosophers call them.