From as early as Plato’s Republic, philosophers have pointed out that family relations pose a threat to justice. Today those concerns have mostly to do with equality: Some parents are able to offer their children advantages such as a private education, social connections, and a handsome inheritance, therefore contributing to the propagation of inequality across generations. These advantages however also come in other softer, forms such as the reading of bedtime stories, or the instilling of a passion for learning. It would seem, therefore, that our concern for justice and equality can lead us to endorse Plato’s solution: the abolition of the family altogether. We would be wrong to do so, however, argues Adam Swift.

The family presents a deep challenge to any theory of social justice. The evidence on social (im)mobility shows that children born into different families face unequal prospects. But few deny that we have a right to family life, which includes the rights of parents to do things to, with and for their children that tend to reproduce inequality across generations. Even those who would happily ban inheritance or elite private schools do not object to parents’ reading their children bedtime stories. So, is there a way to draw a line between the legitimate and illegitimate mechanisms by which parents confer advantages on their children? [1]

It’s widely accepted that parents owe their children a duty of care. They must, if they can, ensure that their children’s interests are adequately met – that they are adequately fed, sheltered, kept safe from harm, and so on. That alone will tend to produce unfair inequalities of opportunity. But, separate from what they must do, morally speaking, for their children, is the issue of what they may do for them. Inequalities of resources (both economic and cultural), and differences in the motivation to use those resources to benefit those children, mean that giving parents the freedom to further their children’s interests will generate further injustice. In what ways may parents treat their children as special, beyond what is required of them by their duty of care, without exceeding the bounds of permissible or legitimate partiality?

In what ways may parents treat their children as special, beyond what is required of them by their duty of care, without exceeding the bounds of permissible or legitimate partiality?

My strategy for answering that question is straightforward. We start by getting clear on why it would be a bad move to abolish the family altogether. Some philosophers – such as Plato – have proposed that radical suggestion. The best way to show that they are wrong is to explain what is valuable about familial relationships. What distinctive contribution do parent-child relationships make to our wellbeing? The first step is to the identify the valuable things  - call them “familial relationship goods” – that explain why we should accept, and indeed welcome, the family as a social institution, despite the conflict with equality and fairness.