From as early as Plato’s Republic, philosophers have pointed out that family relations pose a threat to justice. Today those concerns have mostly to do with equality: Some parents are able to offer their children advantages such as a private education, social connections, and a handsome inheritance, therefore contributing to the propagation of inequality across generations. These advantages however also come in other softer, forms such as the reading of bedtime stories, or the instilling of a passion for learning. It would seem, therefore, that our concern for justice and equality can lead us to endorse Plato’s solution: the abolition of the family altogether. We would be wrong to do so, however, argues Adam Swift.

The family presents a deep challenge to any theory of social justice. The evidence on social (im)mobility shows that children born into different families face unequal prospects. But few deny that we have a right to family life, which includes the rights of parents to do things to, with and for their children that tend to reproduce inequality across generations. Even those who would happily ban inheritance or elite private schools do not object to parents’ reading their children bedtime stories. So, is there a way to draw a line between the legitimate and illegitimate mechanisms by which parents confer advantages on their children? [1]