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3 implausible presuppositions of the hard problem

Contents, cognition and location

Issue 86, 16th March 2020
| Philosopher, neuroscientist and psychiatrist who researches the relationship between the brain and the mind
1,474 words
Read time: approx. 7 mins

Is consciousness as mysterious as suggested by the hard problem?

In a nutshell, the hard problem of consciousness raises the question of why and how consciousness could exist and be real in an otherwise non-conscious world. Sometimes it is erroneous to search directly for answers to the question itself. Instead, it may be more fruitful to question the question: are the basic assumptions of the hard problem viable and plausible?

I deny that the question of the hard problem is sensible, as the presuppositions on which the question rests are not plausible by themselves. I here identify three such implausible presuppositions: first, that consciousness is determined by contents, second that it is cognitive, and third that it can be located in the mind, cognition, brain, body, or world.

If these presuppositions can be replaced by more plausible ones, as I will demonstrate, the question and thus the hard problem itself can be dissolved. In other words, the hard problem is no longer relevant.

We experience the contents of consciousness: the flowers in front of us, the table, and the whole room. What is so special about these contents that they, unlike others, become conscious?

Both philosophers and neuroscientists lead extensive debates concerning this very question. There must be a special add-on, or “extra-ingredient” as David Chalmers says, to conscious contents that is not present in unconscious contents. This special add-on is supposed to be tagged onto contents and thus accompanies the former, but not the latter. Various suggestions have been made about the nature of this special add-on in both philosophy and neuroscience ranging from representation, meta-cognition, self-consciousness, prediction, integration, global workspace, and various others. 

Georg Northoff
Issue 86, 16th March 2020

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silentum excubitor 16 March 2020

I've just finished reading Mr. Georg Northoff's article, above, "The three implausible presuppositions of the hard problem". I would have written "3" instead of "three", and "Hard Problem" instead of using the lower-case, because I think Mr. Northoff is referring to a specific "Hard Problem" as discussed in the rarefied air of the lofty ivory towers Mr. Northoff seems to work in and inhabit. He's described as both a "neuroscientist" AND a "psychiatrist". Now, I understand that any person who legitimately describes themselves as a "neuroscientist" typically holds a Ph.D. degree granted by a University. And "psychiatrists" usually have a medical-school education equivalent, and often, but not always, have an M.D. degree from a legitimate Medical School. But "psychiatrists" are NOT medical doctors. Here's why:
Psychiatry is a pseudoscience, a drugs racket, and a mechanism of social control. It's 21st Century Phrenology, with potent neuro-toxins. Psychiatry has done, and continues to do, FAR MORE HARM than good. Essentially, psychiatrists are quacks, frauds, and pill pushers. Psychiatry is better seen not as the "medical specialty" which it falsely purports to be, but rather a branch of Law Enforcement and the legal Courts, where it more commonly operates. (There are scads of persons who claim residency and legitimacy as "clinical", "research", or even "genetic" psychiatrists, but they're a peripheral issue here....) The current DSM-5, often touted as the "Bible" of psychiatry, is best seen as a CATALOG of BILLING CODES. Everything in it was either invented or created, and NOTHING in it was "discovered". So-called "mental illnesses" are exactly as "real" as presents from Santa Claus, but NOT more "real". Virtually everything that psychiatrists misidentify as so-called "mental illnesses" is in fact the inevitable sequelae of trauma, and/or abuse in their various forms, or else some form of medically identifiable physical, chemical, or other injury or damage. To the extent that ANY "psychiatric diagnosis" has ANY legitimacy, it's 99.9% iatrogenic in causal origin. It's been fairly conclusively proven that ALL common psychiatrically-prescribed pharmaceuticals can, and usually do, cause the very "symptoms" which too often well-meaning psychs then misidentify as being the result of so-called "mental illnesses".
So it was with great interest that I read Mr. Georg Northoff's article debunking the materialist delusions behind the so-called "Hard Problem" I agree 99.9% with him. (I reserve my .1% right of dissent!) But then, I'm a long-time student of H.H. The Dalai Lama, and Mahayana-Tibetan Buddhism.
And I'd like to think that Mr. Georg Northoff concurs with Dr. Peter Breggin, psychiatrist and author of the 1991 masterwork "Toxic Psychiatry", which literally saved my life when I read it in 1993. The problem with the so-called "Hard Problem" is that, really, there's no problem at all! But enough of this Buddhist bullshit! Let's see what Mr. Georg Northoff has to say in reply to me here. But later, ok? I'm not here now. You are.