Is consciousness as mysterious as suggested by the hard problem?

In a nutshell, the hard problem of consciousness raises the question of why and how consciousness could exist and be real in an otherwise non-conscious world. Sometimes it is erroneous to search directly for answers to the question itself. Instead, it may be more fruitful to question the question: are the basic assumptions of the hard problem viable and plausible?

I deny that the question of the hard problem is sensible, as the presuppositions on which the question rests are not plausible by themselves. I here identify three such implausible presuppositions: first, that consciousness is determined by contents, second that it is cognitive, and third that it can be located in the mind, cognition, brain, body, or world.

If these presuppositions can be replaced by more plausible ones, as I will demonstrate, the question and thus the hard problem itself can be dissolved. In other words, the hard problem is no longer relevant.

We experience the contents of consciousness: the flowers in front of us, the table, and the whole room. What is so special about these contents that they, unlike others, become conscious?

Both philosophers and neuroscientists lead extensive debates concerning this very question. There must be a special add-on, or “extra-ingredient” as David Chalmers says, to conscious contents that is not present in unconscious contents. This special add-on is supposed to be tagged onto contents and thus accompanies the former, but not the latter. Various suggestions have been made about the nature of this special add-on in both philosophy and neuroscience ranging from representation, meta-cognition, self-consciousness, prediction, integration, global workspace, and various others. 

Consciousness, however, is not “tagged-on” or “added to” contents and therefore does not come with the contents themselves. Instead, contents are integrated within the ongoing consciousness. Specifically, the flower, the table, and the whole room are connected with and integrated into my ongoing stream of consciousness. The relation of world and consciousness replaces representation of the world in consciousness and integration of world and consciousness replaces their separation.

Such conjoining of relation and integration can be compared to a river. A stone or a ship are related and thereby integrated within the ongoing flow of the river: The better the stone or ship relates to and integrates within the ongoing dynamic of the river, the better they flow within the river’s stream. Analogously, the better the contents of both internal thoughts and external environmental events are related to each other and integrated within the dynamic stream of the brain’s ongoing spontaneous activity, the more likely the respective content becomes conscious.

Accordingly, consciousness is not determined by the representation of contents. Instead, consciousness is characterised by relation and integration within its ongoing stream and, more precisely, the structure and dynamic of that stream which can be traced neuronally to the dynamic of the brain’s spontaneous activity. Therefore, we can now discard the first presupposition, as the determination of consciousness by representation of contents in consciousness can be replaced by structure and dynamic of consciousness itself.

Consciousness is not determined by the representation of contents. Instead, consciousness is characterised by relation.

Consciousness, especially as defined by philosophers, is often conceived as the pinnacle of our cognitive abilities. This conception has continued in neuroscience, where consciousness is determined by specific cognitive functions ranging from prediction, access and meta-cognition.

However, we experience ourselves and the world even when we shut down all our cognitive functions. For example, consider meditation, where we detach ourselves from our cognitions, perceptions, and ultimately even our body.