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The universe is neither clockwork nor alive

What follows and doesn't follow from rejecting scientism

22nd November 2021
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Sidney Morgenbesser Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University and author of Secularism, Identity, and Enchantment (Harvard University Press, 2014).

2,212 words
Read time: approx. 11 mins

Max Weber famously saw modernity as having a disenchanting effect: modern science removed the mystery and moral significance from natural events that religion previously bestowed on them. But philosophers have come to recognize that this disenchantment only follows if we espouse scientism – the idea that science can offer a complete description of nature. What’s less clear is what follows from rejecting scientism. Some philosophers believe that we should re-enchant nature, seeing it as alive, as having intentions and making moral demands on us. However, that doesn’t follow from disavowing scientism. When we say that nature “threatens us” or “punishes us” we are using metaphor, even if that metaphor reveals something metaphysically deep, writes Akeel Bilgrami.

 

One need have no phobia about science whatever, indeed may admire some of its achievements greatly, while finding what has come to be called ‘scientism’ intellectually distasteful.   This is a familiar distinction, oft made.

But while there might be a degree of agreement among philosophers that scientism is a bad thing, it’s not obvious what’s supposed to follow from its rejection. One thing that does follow is that there are properties in nature that aren’t captured by scientific descriptions of nature, like moral properties. What does not follow, however, contrary to what some philosophers believe, is that nature itself literally makes moral demands on us.

Akeel Bilgrami
22nd November 2021

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mlsloan 22 November 2021

My interest is in presenting the science of morality (morality from scientism’s perspective) in ways that will be culturally useful.

So, I was disappointed to read the author’s claim that “One thing that does follow is that there are properties in nature that aren’t captured by scientific descriptions of nature, like moral properties.”

It is true that some moral properties, such as innate bindingness regardless of our needs and preferences, are not captured by scientific descriptions of nature. But there also is no conclusive evidence such properties (or any properties not captured by scientific explanation) have any mind-independent existence. Such properties may only be conjectures or biology-created delusions.

Could any moral properties be sensibly based on scientific descriptions of nature?

In the last 40 years, science has essentially answered the question, “Why do cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist?” The literature supports something like “Cultural moral norms and the judgments made by our moral sense were selected for by the benefits of cooperation they produced, though sometimes by exploiting others.” This simple hypothesis explains virtually all the diversity, contradictions, and strangeness of past and present cultural moral norms and everything we know about our moral sense. (Suggestions for counterexamples are always welcome.)

The further hypothesis “Strategies that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others are universally moral” identifies a subset of descriptively moral behaviors that are “universally moral.” “Universally moral” here refers to being a universal subcomponent of all descriptively moral behaviors. No mysterious bindingness, ‘magic ought’, or “nature making normative demands on us” is implied or wanted.

To aid in achieving shared group goals, it seems helpful to understand “solving cooperation problems without exploiting others” as a moral property. That is, we can use this scientific knowledge about the existence of a universal moral reference to resolve moral disputes and thus better achieve our shared goals.

Now consider moral properties related to questions such as “How should I live?”, “What is good?”, “What are my obligations?”. Science is essentially silent on these ought questions. They also have no objective answers.

Yes, there are moral properties not captured by scientific descriptions of nature. But thus far, they arguably are just speculations. The only moral property I am aware of that does have an objective existence is solely a product of the scientific description of cultural moral norms and our moral sense.

Couldn’t it be helpful to focus more attention on an objective moral property rather than speculative moral properties?