Truth isn't correspondence with the facts

Habermas and the social nature of truth

Truth is what corresponds with the facts, right? That might seem like a simple and common-sense view, but as it turns out it is far from either of those things. Despite its many complications, the correspondence theory of truth is the default that contemporary analytic philosophers espouse. Perhaps surprisingly, critical theorist Jürgen Habermas can help us formulate a more plausible account of truth. Habermas reminds us of the social processes involved in our inquiry into the truth: it’s a never-ending attempt to generate social agreement through open, non-coercive and honest communication with others, writes Paul Giladi.

 

The correspondence theory of truth enjoyed, and still does to an extent, a rather privileged status in the Anglo-American philosophical world: it was (and in some circles remains) the default way Anglo-American philosophers answered one of the Big Questions of philosophy. Truth, according to this theory, amounts to correspondence with reality. In other words, a sentence is true when it corresponds to the way things are in the world, the facts, if you like.

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