You probably think that lying is wrong. According to the philosophical view known as the error theory, this thought ascribes wrongness to lying, but wrongness does not exist. This means that lying is not wrong. You may think that in that case lying is permissible. But according to the error theory, the thought that lying is permissible ascribes permissibility to lying, and permissibility does not exist either. So the error theory says that lying is neither wrong nor permissible. And it says the same thing about anything else you may want to do.
At first glance this theory may seem crazy. But the arguments for the error theory are surprisingly strong. Suppose that you are convinced by these arguments. If so, what should you do? Should you stop believing that lying is wrong? Should you just tell lies whenever you feel like it?
Defenders of the theory give different answers to this question. Some think that you should simply stop believing that lying is wrong. Others agree that you should stop believing this, but add that you should instead start to pretend that lying is wrong. And some think that you should keep believing that lying is wrong even though this belief is inconsistent with your belief in the error theory.
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"Just as a theory can be true if we do not believe it, a theory can also be true if we cannot believe it"
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Opponents of the theory often criticise these answers: they say that giving up your belief that lying is wrong would have bad consequences, that pretending that lying is wrong will not motivate you not to lie, and that it is hard to knowingly have inconsistent beliefs.
But I think these answers face a different problem. Most defenders of the error theory only defend this theory about moral judgements. I think, however, that the best arguments for the error theory support a general error theory about all normative judgements: all thoughts about what is right, wrong, permissible, good, bad, a reason for action, for belief, and so on. If this general error theory is true, there is nothing whatsoever that you should do. So there is then also nothing whatsoever that you should do if you come to believe the error theory.
The arguments for this general error theory are not direct arguments for the theory, but are instead arguments against the alternatives to the theory. When I consider each of these arguments on its own, I am convinced that it is sound. But when I consider all of them together, something strange happens. I am unable to form a belief in the theory they support: a general error theory about all normative judgements. Something stops me from forming this belief.
Issue 73, 7th May 2019
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