Sluggish growth, a loss of trust, a culture of blame, an unequal burden of austerity, growing deflationary pressures: it’s hardly the most tempting of cocktails. We are threatened with a dystopian world of economic and financial failure, leading to political instability on the grandest of scales. We may no longer be engaged in twentieth-century debates about the relative benefits of the free market versus central planning. Marxist- Leninist dogma has, thankfully, disappeared from view. But we are in danger of letting a culture of blame and mistrust develop. We cannot understand why we have to make sacrifices so we search, instead, for sacrificial lambs. It’s a convenient approach, absolving ourselves from blame even as we construct a narrative to blame others. Yet if we all follow the same approach, it won’t be long before the politics of isolation, introspection and even hatred makes a comeback.

Indeed, it may already be with us. Support for the UK Independence Party has surged, reflecting both disillusion with mainstream parties and a desire on behalf of some voters to leave the European Union and impose strict controls on immigration. At the time of writing, French opinion polls suggested that Marine Le Pen, the leader of the Front Nationale, would at the very least make it through to the second round of the 2017 French Presidential election. German creditors and southern European debtors cannot agree on who is responsible for the Eurozone crisis and who, ultimately, should pay, leading to severe economic and political fractures.

Economic setback breeds political extremism. When the cake isn’t big enough, when there aren’t enough slices to go round, anger quickly takes over. Political movements that normally wouldn’t see the light of day suddenly become mainstream. Think of bloody revolution in eighteenth-century France, anti-Chinese legislation in late nineteenth-century America, anti-Semitism in nineteenth-century Germany and the rise of fascism and Soviet communism in the 1920s and 1930s. Each of these toxic developments was rooted in economic setback. Stagnation not only creates Adam Smith’s melancholy state but also serves as an incubator for what might loosely be termed ‘supremacist’ political movements that thrive on the ridiculous idea that their followers are somehow better than others, in the process invoking hatred towards minorities of whatever race, colour or creed. Stagnation may not be as bad, economically, as depression but, by imposing year after year of austerity, the risk of political turmoil only increases.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the rise of nationalism was, in part, a reaction both to the oppression of empire and of financial failure. The re-emergence of nationalism in the twenty-first century would likely be a reaction to the anonymity – and perceived failure – of globalisation. Global capital markets and autonomous nation-states do not sit happily side by side. We may have reached the limits of what globalisation can achieve, partly because we’re not sure we can easily live with its effects. Yet the return of nationalism will only damage our long-term prospects. Short of workers and facing economic stagnation and heightened inequality, we are no longer capable of making good the promises we’ve made to ourselves. If we are to have any hope of salvaging something for our economic futures, it must come from our increased engagement with the rest of the world. A retreat back to the nationalist, protectionist and racist world of the first half of the twentieth century, whether driven by rivalries within continents or between continents, would only take us down a path towards economic, financial and political oblivion.