Who Shaves the Barber?

Is mathematics shakier than we realised?

In the second half of the nineteenth century, logic awoke from a sleep of two millennia: people realised that Aristotle, with his syllogisms, had yet to have the last word on the subject. Powerful and flexible systems were developed by the English mathematician George Boole as well as by the German logician Gottlob Frege. Soon, however, logic found itself entangled in self-reference (a statement which refers to itself or its own referent). Curiously, the self-reference debate was contemporary with the discovery of quantum theory, and Austrian logician Kurt Gödel's theorem of incompleteness was proved at about the same time as the uncertainty principle, with similar effects.

One of the first thinkers to point to self-reference, while Frege's work was in press, was the British philosopher Bertrand Russell. One form of his paradox refers to a village where the barber shaves precisely those people who do not shave themselves. Who shaves the barber? In particular, does the barber shave himself?

If he does, then he is one of the people shaved by the barber, and so doesn't shave himself, a contradiction. But on the opposite assumption, we fall into the same trap.

Russell’s question has the same structure as the simpler version of self-reference often set forth: "this statement is false". We cannot maintain consistently that this statement is either true or false, since each implies the opposite.

In passing, note, too, that the more innocent-looking statement "this statement is true" has problems of its own. You can consistently maintain that it is true; but you can also consistently maintain that it is false. So you can't prove it either way.

These are more than curious puzzles; they strike at the foundations of logic on which mathematics is built, and of course mathematics is essential for science. As a result, many people (Russell and Whitehead, Zermelo, Fraenkel, and others) attacked the problem. In the view of most mathematicians, they built a satisfactory system in which Russell's and similar paradoxes could be avoided.

Then along came Kurt Gödel, with the statement: "this statement cannot be proved". Here the problem is deeper. If this statement is true, then it can't be proved, and our logical system is incomplete. But if it is false, then it can be proved, and our system is inconsistent (it can prove a false statement).

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Stephen Younghusband 7 September 2021

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Alex Maddyson 26 August 2021

Thanks for the interesting article, I work as an aerospace engineer in the https://engre.co/ engineering market and I am thinking about this paradox. The Barber Paradox (Russell Paradox), discovered by Bertrand Russell in 1901, shows that an apparently plausible scenario is logically impossible.
Imagine there is only one male hairdresser in town who claims to shave all the men in town who never shave but does not shave everyone who shaves. This sounds very logical until the next question is asked: Does the barber shave? If a hairdresser doesn't shave, he must follow his rule and shave. However, if he does shave, then according to the rule he will not shave.
Russell's paradox, reformulated in the context of the so-called "naive" set theory, exposed a huge problem and completely changed the direction of 20th-century mathematics.
Just like a barber who shaves, but should not, and therefore should not, and should! Russell's paradox means that there is a contradiction at the heart of the naive set theory. That is, there is a statement S such that both it and its negation (not S) are true, where the statement S is the following: "the set of all sets that are not elements of themselves contains itself."
The Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice was developed to avoid Russell's paradox.

Roger 26 July 2014

The way I think of Russell's Paradox about the barber is as follows. I suggest that a thing exists if it is a grouping or relationship defining what is contained within. In the case of a set, S, set S doesn't even exist until the elements contained within it are completely defined. Once the elements in the set are defined and set S exists, if you try to stick a new element into the set, it's no longer set S, but some other set, say T, that has the elements in S plus one the new element. In the case of the barber, define set B as the set of all those people who don't shave themselves. The barber cannot be a member of this set because to be in the set you're not allowed to shave yourself. Once set B exists (without the barber), you can't say that the barber might shave himself because that would be like trying to stick the barber back into a set once the set already exists. If you try to stick him back in the set by saying he shaves himself, you're changing the membership of the set after the fact and thereby create a new set, that's not set B.
So, the barber cannot shave himself.

I think you can apply this same type of reasoning to Godel's Incompletness theorem. If anyone's interested, my version of this, along with a little more on Russell's Paradox is at my website at

https://sites.google.com/site/ralphthewebsite/filecabinet/theory-russell-paradox-godel

Thanks.