We tend to think that words refer to things in the world. We believe words latch on to parts of reality, and that these connections are the fundamental source of linguistic meaning. But linguist and philosopher Paul Pietroski argues this is a mistake and offers an alternative approach to meaning. Words do not refer to things, Pietroski argues, and meaning is instead determined by the construction of complex concepts from simpler ones.
Many animals can think about things. A horse can think intently about an apple that it sees in your hand. Humans can think and talk about lots of things that we can’t perceive. Consider dinosaurs, Shakespeare, the Earth’s metallic inner core, fairness, nuclear fusion, and next week. How can our minds reach so far, with such ease? Words surely help. But how?
A typical child acquires thousands of words. Acquiring ‘apple’ usually involves thinking about an apple that someone is talking about; but it’s hard to see how we could think about dinosaurs or weeks without having any words. We can think by “talking to ourselves;” but it’s hard to see how using words could let us think about things. To help organize the questions in this vicinity, I’ll sketch two pictures of how speech is related to thought, and then modify the first by stealing from the second.
1. Words as Vehicles for Personal Concepts
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