Information theory argues that to be is to be a real pattern. But what is information and how does it relate to matter?
It seems that the kind of materialism defended by the ancient Greek atomists and their successors in early modern natural philosophy is not viable. Atoms are not partless particles, and the particles that compose atoms are excitation modes of fields whose ultimate nature is tied up with questions about extra dimensions and the interpretation of mathematical structures used in physics.
Science has also developed to the extent that it now gives us ontology at many levels. Within the physical sciences we have a rough hierarchy from the solids and fluids of geology through the molecular structure of chemical kinds to the atoms and their orbiting electrons, to the subatomic realm of particles and fundamental forces, to quantum fields, superstrings and beyond.
The biological and behavioural sciences are much more complex but similarly offer us layers of entities from proteins to social groups. What makes all these entities count as physical? We certainly cannot straightforwardly identify them with collections of entities that are described by physics. Their place in the unified scientific account of reality is based on the shared system of units, the conservation of energy, the gravitational, electromagnetic and nuclear forces, and the basic classification of the elements expressed in the periodic table. In science we have integration and not always reduction.
Join the conversation