The problem of consciousness is one of the hardest facing science and philosophy today. But in order to inquire fruitfully into this great problem, we first need to make sure we are asking the same question, and have an adequate initial clarification of what we are talking about. There are perhaps five leading ideas in the existing philosophy and science of consciousness: qualia; what it is like for something to be that thing; subjectivity; intentionality; and phenomenality. Each of these five ideas has advanced inquiry in different directions, but they have all failed to provide an initial clarification of the subject. They demonstrate the unfortunate fact that minds are not meeting – we seem concerned with different subjects.
As a result of this disagreement about definitions of consciousness, we have seen the emergence of a number of competing theories. There is a clear confrontation between functionalism and mentalism, for example, and, most obviously, a confrontation between the different subjects of mentality in general and conscious mentality somehow conceived, maybe conscious mentality inchoately conceived as actual consciousness.
I propose that consciousness clarified as consciousness in the primary ordinary sense, as actual consciousness, is the rich fact of what is subjectively physical in the three ways. That is to say, first, that if you look at advocacy of the five leading ideas, you can accumulate data in fact owed to our hold on our consciousness, linguistic data that records our knowledge of our consciousness. This is consciousness in the (or a) primary ordinary sense. You can add to the evidence right now by reflecting on what it is for you to see the room you are in without attending to it. You can add to the data as well by thinking it must be getting on for 7 o'clock, and wanting to hear the radio news.
Join the conversation