Elon Musk’s imminent purchase of Twitter, and his view that free speech online should extend as far as the law allows, has led some progressive thinkers to exclaim their despair. But not so long ago, the fundamental distrust of anyone who wanted to restrict free speech was a pillar of progressive thought, even at the recognition that absolute free speech was not feasible or desirable. Revisiting some of those older arguments about why constraining free speech can lead to uncritical belief in authority is needed. That is not to say there should be no moderation of online speech when it comes to personal attacks. Conflating the freedom to dissent and even engage in conspiratorial thinking, with the freedom to attack others is a confusion that only libertarians make, and we should avoid, argues Peter Godfrey-Smith.

Many people, especially on the "progressive" side of politics, seem in recent years to have given up on a combination of views about free speech that was common not long ago. The position I have in mind is one that accepts that the basic principles and proper borders in this area are difficult matters, and an ideal of pure or absolute free expression is not feasible, but combines this recognition with a strong tendency to favor free expression in practice and to be habitually distrustful of restriction – expecting it to go too far, to misfire in various ways, and do more harm than good.

The move away from this combination of attitudes has probably been partly due to changing agendas within progressive politics (heightened concern about racism and hate speech, for example). But alongside this, if an explicit defence of the shift were to be given, it might be that the landscape of information exchange has been transformed in ways that make a new approach necessary. The internet has opened up the possibility of instant and wide dissemination of ideas that have adverse consequences on an unprecedented scale. Information flow is also subject to less gate-keeping by publishers, editors, and other old-media forces. With the stakes now so high, more restriction is needed, and new media and technology companies have a responsibility to exert a greater level of control over what appears on their platforms.

The problems this attitude responds to are real, but I don't support the shift. The new situation we find ourselves in has a mix of features, some of which give plenty of support for the attitude I described at the start, an attitude where the presumption against restriction is strong.

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Defences of free speech might be put into two broad categories. One kind appeals to the moral value of individual autonomy, or something along those lines. Another kind of argument is based on consequences, costs and benefits, and the search for political arrangements that are likely to enable a society to enable human flourishing and avoid missteps. As J.S. Mill noted in his classic defence of "liberty of thought and discussion" in the nineteenth century: authorities are not infallible; in cases when they are largely right there may be something to learn from radically contrary opinions; and even well-founded ideas deaden when they are not subject to active debate.

I think there is a good deal to be said for both kinds of defence. Given the current perception that the more practical, consequence-based arguments are weaker than before, those are the ones I will discuss here.