Wittgenstein is known as a philosopher who sought to cure philosophy from unclear thinking. For him, philosophy’s attempts to answer traditional metaphysical questions like “Is there a God?”, “What is the nature of reality”, “Do we have free will?” end up in confusion and nonsense. But in his attempt to avoid the pitfalls of traditional metaphysics, Wittgenstein ends up asking questions about the way we make sense of things, that are metaphysical, argues A.W. Moore.

 This is the sixthinstalment in our series The Return of Metaphysics, in partnership with the Essentia Foundation. Read the series' previous articles The Return of Metaphysics: Hegel vs Kant, The Return of Idealism: Hegel vs Russell,  Derrida and the trouble with metaphysics,The Return of Metaphysics: Russell and Realism, and After Metaphysics: Rorty and American Pragmatism.

It is well known that Wittgenstein’s early philosophical work and his later philosophical work are marked by various profound differences of style and content.  Nevertheless, there are some equally profound and very significant continuities.  Among these are his conception of philosophy itself and, relatedly, an apparent recoil from metaphysics.  Let us look at these in turn.