What is forgiveness? Is forgiving always a moral and praiseworthy thing to do? Or are there certain acts that are so terrible that they are deemed ‘unforgivable’? Is there, furthermore, a distinction between personal and political forgiveness? These are some of the central questions under discussion in the burgeoning contemporary literature on forgiveness.

Let us begin with how to define ‘forgiveness’. The central debate here is between those who endorse an emotional model, on the one hand, and those who embrace a pluralistic one, on the other. According to the emotional model, forgiveness is conceptualised as an internal matter requiring a change of heart. On this account, forgiveness consists in the renouncing of negative emotions on moral grounds, which exist as a natural response to having being wronged. Although there exists considerable debate about exactly which emotions forgiveness should overcome, many contemporary theorists maintain that forgiveness consists in the overcoming of resentment. This is understood broadly to include various vindictive passions, such as anger; the desire to strike back; hatred; and the desire to see the wrongdoer punished. Critics, however, have pointed out that our response to wrongdoing does not always include emotions. Indeed, even where emotions are felt, these are not always vindictive. For instance, common emotional responses to culpable wrongdoing include sadness, disappointment, resignation, and pity, among many others. In contrast, perhaps a change of emotion is neither sufficient nor necessary for forgiveness. Perhaps forgiveness involves broad and varied practices and what ‘counts’ as an act of forgiveness will depend in part on whether those involved see it as such.