The recent death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, former leader of the Wagner Group,  represents not just a consolidation of power by Putin, but also the culmination of a strategic shift in Russia's warfare methods. Lasha Tchantouridze argues that the Wagner Group has served its purpose in Ukraine by providing a human shield for the Russian military while it reoriented towards old and tested Soviet methods. This new adoption of old ideas marks a pivotal moment in the trajectory of the war, significant enough to alter its outcome.

Observers of the war in Ukraine have noted that the Russian army has done considerably better in 2023 than last year. Ukraine’s ground offensive of 2023, aimed at recapturing the territory lost to the Russians in 2022, has progressed slowly and methodically. Still, the Russians have so far avoided significant concessions and even managed occasional counterattacks. Ukraine's slow progress has been primarily due to the Russian troops' good battlefield and logistics organization. By comparison, Russia’s 2022 campaign was dominated by chaos and confusion. The infamous “meat grinder” push for Bakhmut, headed by the recently deceased Yevgeniy Prigozhin, head of the Wagner Group, is what separates these two distinct phases of the war in Ukraine. The chaos of the first months of the war were the direct product of the 2008-2021 unsuccessful military reforms initiated by Putin and guided by General Valery Gerasimov. What’s responsible for the change of fortune the second year of the war has been the reversal of those reforms and a return to old Soviet military textbooks on defensive operations. Thus important shift in strategy could alter the outcome of the war.