Our choices and actions are often influenced by factors we aren’t conscious of. That has lead some philosophers to claim that we can’t possibly be held morally accountable for those actions since we didn’t freely and consciously choose them. But that would mean that people acting on damaging unconscious biases, like a doctor prescribing less medicine to black patients than to white patients, can’t be held responsible for malpractice. Instead of letting people off the hook, we should hold people responsible and train them to recognize the ways in which unconscious influences can affect their decisions, argue Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Uri Maoz, and Liad Mudrik.

If a driver backs a car over a kitten, is the driver morally responsible for the kitten’s death? Not if the driver was not aware of the kitten and took reasonable precautions to check behind the car—at least according to most people. Because the driver is not morally responsible, we should not be angry at them, despite our sadness about the kitten. If we did criticize the driver, then they could legitimately respond, “I didn’t know, so don’t blame me.” Cases like this suggest that consciousness of morally relevant facts might be necessary for moral responsibility, except perhaps when the agent is careless or negligent and should be aware of the relevant facts, for example because lots of cats are hanging around.