Motivated by Darwin’s theory of evolution, we think consciousness must have a function. We think consciousness must play some role in our behaviour, and be able to cause and influence what we do. We think about raising our left arm, and then it raises. Surely consciousness has causal power. But this is an illusion, writes Helen Yetter-Chappell.

For more on Darwin vs Consciousness, the world’s largest philosophy and music festival, HowTheLightGetsIn, will be hosting a debate this May. Featuring Denis Noble, Stuart Hameroff, Antonella Tramacere and Güneş Taylor debating whether consciousness and the theory of evolution are incompatible.

You go up to a food truck and order a falafel wrap. Why? Because you felt hungry. You grab a hot pan on the stove, and you pull your hand back, yelping. Why? Because touching the pan hurt. Our world is filled not just with physical objects around us, but with conscious experiences. And our conscious experiences guide us in our interactions with the world. Nothing could be more obvious.

… Or so the standard picture goes. I think this picture is wrong. I agree that there are physical objects. And I agree that there are conscious sensations of hunger and pain. What I disagree with is the idea that conscious sensations guide us – or influence our behavior in any way – as we interact with the physical world. If I’m right, there is no causal interaction between our conscious experiences and the physical world. This is a position philosophers call epiphenomenalism. It may sound crazy at first, but it’s well-motivated once you appreciate the arguments for it.

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The epiphenomenalist concludes that consciousness doesn’t explain our behavior.

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Mental States Aren’t Causal

Why would one be an epiphenomenalist? The basic motivation comes from embracing two claims: