Liberal democracies around the world are under threat. Oxford Politics Professor Giovanni Capoccia argues that there’s a paradox that prevents efforts to defend them. Illiberal movements are easiest to stop early, when they’re small and their true intentions are hidden. But propaganda and subtle erosion prevent democratic forces from acting quickly, as they don’t realize the threat until it’s too late. By the time the danger is undeniable, the tools to fight back become politically impossible to use. Democrats must now prepare for a challenging war of position and use every means at their disposal to fight back.

In a way that seemed unimaginable only a generation ago, the worldwide rise of illiberal movements is now threatening liberal democracies everywhere, including those once universally considered stable and consolidated. Like the totalitarian parties of the 1930s, today’s illiberal parties exploit liberal democracy’s rights and freedoms to subvert it. Illiberal forces have gained power through elections in the United States, Turkey, India, Hungary, and Poland, among others, where they have eroded constitutional checks on executive power, weakened judicial independence, curtailed media freedom, and limited the right to public protest. In other countries, including several in Western Europe, rising illiberal oppositions seek to emulate them. What can pro-democratic forces do to counter the rise of illiberal parties and movements that threaten to turn liberal democracy into an illiberal regime?

Standard answers centered on “addressing the social grievances that fuel extremism” are no longer sufficient. To be sure, stimulating economic growth, reducing unemployment and inequality, fostering social mobility, and strengthening civic education remain important. However, policies targeting these goals can yield results only in the long term. Even if democrats had enacted them at the right time—for example, to address the social strains caused by the 2007-08 financial crisis—illiberal forces rose too rapidly over the last two decades for these policies alone to contain them. Where democrats primarily failed was in enacting measures to counter illiberal forces in the short term. Doing so would have bought them the time necessary to regroup and address the roots of discontent, while putting in place a systematic strategy of democratic defense.

The paradox

The democrats’ failure can in good part be attributed to a paradox they face. When facing a newly emerging illiberal opposition, or an executive that unexpectedly starts eroding liberal democracy, pro-democratic forces confront a paradox relating to the timing of their intervention. In principle, democrats can act quickly, and when they do, they can typically rely on a wide range of countermeasures.

When a newly installed executive begins implementing reforms that curb checks and balances, democratic oppositions can react immediately—by filibustering in parliament, litigating in court, and taking to the streets to protest. When liberal-democratic parties (of either the right or the left) govern, and a new extremist opposition emerges, democratic majorities can mobilize civil society against them—for example, by organizing counterdemonstrations and boycotts. They can also draw on the tradition of “militant democracy” (a liberal democracy that actively fights extremist dissent) to target them with formal and informal restrictions.

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In other words, if they act early, democrats typically have plenty of arrows in their quiver, which makes their success in countering illiberals more likely. However, their quick response is typically hindered by uncertainty. Often, democrats do not recognize a new illiberal challenge right away, and illiberals themselves actively obfuscate their real intentions. When, finally, their actions make the extent of the threat clear, most countermeasures are no longer viable, and success becomes elusive.

Facing democratic erosion