We do not discover reality, we create it

Our theories help make the world, not uncover it

we do not discover reality we create it

We tend to think reality is out there waiting to be discovered. But philosopher Manuel Delaflor argues that experience, meaning, and ontology are active constructions, not passive receptions of a knowable world. Once we see that categories are created, not discovered, realism gives way to responsibility, and the question shifts from what reality is, to what reality are we choosing to create.

 

My sister is a graphic designer, someone who has spent two decades swimming in colour palettes. She once laid out some blues on her screen and asked me to name them. Azure, cerulean, cobalt, sapphire, she rattled off, pointing at squares I could only call “blue.” To her, they were as different as a dog and a horse. Her visual system had carved the continuous spectrum into slices mine simply could not access. That moment has stayed with me. If her blues are not my blues, and if training made the difference, then what else have I been missing? What categories do we walk around believing we discovered in the world, when in fact we manufactured them ourselves, through language, through habit, through purpose? And if this is true of something as basic as colour, what does it mean for everything else we think we see?

We tell ourselves a flattering story: out there is a world, pre-sorted into kinds, and our job is to discover those kinds. Rocks as rocks. Faces as faces. Colours sit waiting in the spectrum like crayons in a box. This is the myth of discovery, and it runs so deep we rarely notice it. It feels grounded, and we need grounding. It feels like the opposite of arrogance. Right? But examine it closely and the story collapses. I give you a hint on the reason: when something makes sense, it never means it is right. It means it clicks into place inside your existing maps. And that is why when we go around pretending to be certain about what “makes sense” is the easiest form of self-deception.

Return with me to the blue. Russian speakers make an obligatory distinction between lighter blues (goluboy) and darker blues (siniy), a division as fundamental as the English distinction between green and blue. This touches on the linguistic relativity Benjamin Lee Whorf hinted at. Now, of course we could console ourselves by saying this is just language, just words, but that consolation evaporates the moment we look deeper. The implication is merciless. The blues my sister sees were not discovered. They were instantiated. Brought into being by attention, vocabulary, and purpose. And it goes further still. Researchers Gabriele Jordan and John Mollon report rare cases consistent with tetrachromacy: four cone photopigments instead of three, and in some cases colour discriminations most of us cannot make. These individuals are not seeing the same spectrum more accurately. They are seeing a different spectrum altogether.

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Even the most fundamental boundary we take for granted, the boundary of the self, is an achievement of an active model.

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Jonathan Colvin 28 January 2026

Instead of arbitrary assertion, infinite regress or circularity, there is an alternative; structural realism/ontic structural reaslism. At the base are necessary mathematical truths. The laws of physics supervene on these, and everything else supervenes on physics. Clearly the models of our perception only partially correlate to objective reality (is the dress blue?) but that's why the fundamental physics of quantum fields and general relativity have left intuition far, far behind.

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Walter Gladwin 27 January 2026




You might be interested in Copilot's critique of your article which I reproduce below.

Your article is a polished, rhetorically powerful defence of model‑dependent ontology, but its persuasiveness relies heavily on selective examples, conceptual slippage, and a few philosophical shortcuts. A rigorous critique needs to separate the strong claims from the weak ones.

1. Strengths of the Article
A. Excellent use of perceptual psychology
The author draws on well‑documented cases—colour categorisation, blindsight, prosopagnosia, size‑constancy failures, Charles Bonnet syndrome—to show that perception is not passive reception but an active construction. These examples are legitimate and widely accepted in cognitive science.

B. Effective narrative framing
The writing is engaging and uses vivid anecdotes to make abstract points intuitive. The rhetorical arc—“you think you’re discovering reality, but actually you’re building it”—is compelling.

C. A useful reminder about metrics and social constructs
The coastline paradox, GDP, IQ, and money are good illustrations of how measurement choices shape what we treat as real. These are genuinely important points about operational definitions.

2. Where the Argument Overreaches
A. Conflating epistemology with ontology
The central move—“because perception is constructed, reality itself is constructed”—is a category error.

Showing that our access to reality is mediated by models
does not imply that reality itself is model‑dependent.

The article slides from “we construct experiences” to “we construct the world” without argument.

This is the same leap that critics often accuse Hoffman and radical constructivists of making.

B. Misuse of the Münchhausen Trilemma
The trilemma is presented as if it uniquely undermines scientific realism.
But it applies equally to the author’s own position.

If realism collapses into circularity or regress, so does model‑dependent ontology.
The article treats the trilemma as a one‑way weapon, which is philosophically inconsistent.

C. Selective use of perceptual anomalies
Cases like blindsight or restored vision show that perception requires learned models, but they do not show that:

objects do not exist independently of perception

categories are arbitrary

ontology is optional

They show that brains must interpret signals, not that signals have no external source.

D. Overstating cultural relativity
Examples like Russian colour terms or the Endeavour anecdote are used to imply that categories are created ex nihilo. But:

Linguistic relativity effects are real but modest.

The Endeavour story is almost certainly apocryphal.

Even without a category, humans detect anomalies; they simply misclassify them.

The article uses these cases to support a much stronger thesis than they can bear.

E. The “no floor” claim is asserted, not demonstrated
The author repeatedly insists that there is “no bottom,” “no final layer,” “turtles all the way down.”
But this is a philosophical stance, not a consequence of the evidence presented.

Physics may or may not have a fundamental level, but perceptual psychology cannot decide that question.

3. Internal Tensions in the Argument
A. Pragmatism vs. anti‑realism
The article ends by saying:

models are judged by whether they work

actions have consequences

failures are real constraints

But this is pragmatic realism in disguise.
If consequences constrain models, then something independent of the model is doing the constraining.

You cannot simultaneously claim:

“There is no objective reality,” and

“Your bridge collapses if your model is wrong.”

The second statement presupposes the first is false.

B. Responsibility requires some stable ground
The author argues that abandoning realism leads to responsibility.
But responsibility presupposes:

stable consequences

shared constraints

some intersubjective continuity

If all categories are freely instantiated, responsibility becomes unintelligible.

4. What the Article Gets Right but Underdevelops
A. Toolkits shape what we notice
This is Kuhn’s strongest insight, and the article uses it well.
But Kuhn never claimed that paradigms create reality—only that they shape scientific practice.

B. Measurement is not neutral
The coastline paradox and GDP example are excellent reminders that quantification is theory‑laden.
This is a legitimate critique of naïve empiricism.

5. Overall Assessment
The article is rhetorically powerful and philosophically stimulating, but it:

overextends empirical findings to make metaphysical claims they cannot support

conflates perception with ontology

uses the trilemma selectively

slides between pragmatism and anti‑realism without resolving the tension

Its best insights are epistemological:
our models shape what we can see, measure, and act upon.

Its weakest claims are ontological:
that therefore reality itself is model‑dependent.

A more defensible version of the thesis would be:

We do not discover all of reality; we discover some of it through models that we construct.

But the article pushes toward a stronger, more dramatic claim that is not supported by the evidence it presents.

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Alisa Skinner 26 January 2026

After reading this I see more clearly where I have been lost while reading Speaking Being (Bruce Hyde and Drew Kopp) in a group. The moment I believe I understand-I unequivocally cannot. What a conundrum. Wonderful read. If nothing else I feel less alone in the wondering.

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Mark Connely 25 January 2026

I understand, and I'm with you, until I ask whether this understanding is not itself a model mistaken for an objective ontology, then I'm confused again.

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