On February 1st a national vaccine mandate took effect in Austria. Those over the age of 18 who have not been vaccinated could face fines up to €3,600. Several other countries have introduced similar mandates for the elderly, medical staff and care home workers. Putting aside the question of whether these mandates are effective, there are concerns around their ethical status. Those resisting vaccination say it should be their choice whether to get the jab, not the state’s. Others argue that in liberal societies, the state has a right to limit the freedom of individuals when their behaviour harms others. Whether vaccine mandates are morally justifiable or not, then, turns on whether the unvaccinated harm the rest of the population. Given how Covid vaccines work, it’s hard to make that case, argues Stephen John.
Would you shoot a loaded gun into the air above a crowd? I assume not.
Should other people be allowed to shoot into the air above crowds? Obviously not.
Are you vaccinated against Covid-19? For your own sake, I hope so: Covid-19 can be fatal, and the risks of vaccination are miniscule.
Should other people be allowed to remain unvaccinated? Now we have a controversial question! Recent Austrian legislation making vaccination mandatory has caused huge protests, and debates rage across Europe.
In an influential article Jessica Flanigan has argued that mandatory vaccination should be no more controversial than laws against shooting in crowded public spaces. We restrict the shooter's liberty because she avoidably imposes significant risks of harm on others. In choosing not to get vaccinated, the argument goes, the anti-vaxxer imposes avoidable risks of harm on others. Therefore, if we can restrict the shooter's liberty, so, too, we can restrict the anti-vaxxer's liberty. That's not to say we must introduce vaccine mandates here-and-now. Maybe they will cause so much resentment that they backfire, or maybe we can achieve mass vaccination more simply. Still, Flanigan’s argument implies there is no in-principle objection to mandates.
Unsurprisingly, philosophers puzzle over this argument: is an omission - not getting vaccinated - equivalent to an action - shooting a gun? Does the argument rule out posing any risk of harm to others? But there is a far simpler concern with Flanigan’s analogy. Flanigan assumes that getting vaccinated significantly reduces the risk we will transmit viruses to others. However, it's not clear Covid-19 vaccinations significantly affect transmission. This makes it very hard to justify mandatory Covid-19 vaccination within liberal societies.
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We can only compel vaccination when doing so is a proportional response to the risks of harm you pose to others.
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To think through these questions, it is useful to go back to the work of John Stuart Mill, the great Nineteenth Century theorist of liberty. Mill wrote:
"The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."
This "harm principle" distinguishes two kinds of restrictions on individual liberty: those intended to prevent an individual causing harm to herself, and those intended to prevent an individual causing harm to others. Mill opposes the first kind, arguing that each should be allowed to undertake "experiments in living". However, self-experimentation shouldn't harm others, justifying some restrictions.
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